This paper provides new insights on the workings of the market for expert services and investigates the e¤ects of entry on the incentives of experts to provide high quality services. Experts are motivated by reputational concerns and clients are characterized by an unobservable type which a¤ects their willingness to pay for the service and may a¤ect the informativeness of the performance of the expert as a signal of her talent, and the likelihood the expert succeeds in providing a high quality service. The paper shows that clients sorting a¤ects incentives through three channels: modifying current and future equilibrium fees, modifying the informativeness of good performance as a signal of expert talent, modifying the marginal e¢ ciency of e¤ort. Entry of experts impacts the sorting behaviour of clients in equilibrium, and thus incentives of experts. The main result is that increased entry reduces incentives to exert e¤ort, although when clients types a¤ect the likelihood the service is provided successfully the opposite may occur. However, even when e¤ort is lower in equilibrium after increased entry, welfare may be larger as more clients can be served. The results of the model can be applied to examine the e¤ects of entry in such markets as investment banking services, lawyers, professional consultancies.
Introduction and Motivation
This paper provides new insights on the workings of the market for professional (expert) services.
A key feature of such markets, which is often overlook, is the important role of client sorting on the incentives of experts to provide the service at a high standard. Most of the literature focussed on the role played by the coexistence of experts with di¤erent reputations. Investment banks of di¤erent I wish to thank my supervisor Antoine Faure -Grimaud for his helpful guidance, Rocco Macchiavello for helpful suggestions on a way to streamline an early version of the model, and colleagues at the LSE and the Bank of Italy for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are my own. The views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessairly coincide with those of the Bank of Italy. Corresponding address: e.sette@lse.ac.uk reputation compete in the market for …nancial services. In the medical practice, patients can be treated by luminaries or general practitioners. Legal assistance can be provided by Perry Mason, as well as by unknown members of the Bar. However, clients can be widely heterogenous too: merging …rms can be of di¤erent size, so that a merger between two large multinationals can involve greater complexity than one involving two small local …rms, patients can require sophisticated operations, or more standard treatments, defendants can go to court facing a complex murder accusation or a trivial quarrel with neighbours. Heterogenous clients derive a di¤erent utility from hiring experts of di¤erent reputation, so that a …rm with a very promising project might value more the services of a famed investment bank in the going public process than …rms with less promising investment plans. A patient with a rare illness might bene…t more from the expertise of a luminary, than a patient needing to …x a broken arm. Thus, heterogenous clients may …nd it optimal to sort into experts of di¤erent quality who are motivated by reputational concerns. This paper identi…es three channels through which sorting a¤ects the incentives of experts to exert e¤ort. The …rst channel is that the way clients sort into experts determine the balance between the demand and the supply of services for experts of that reputation, and thus may impact on the premium that clients pay in equilibrium to be served by more reputable experts. This is turn a¤ects the value to build a reputation and thus incentives to exert e¤ort. I dub this the "fees channel ". The second channel is that the sorting of clients may in ‡uence the informativeness of a success as a signal of talent. If the type of a client provides information on the di¢ culty of the service to be provided, then if an expert serves successfully clients who are on average "more di¢ cult", she will build a reputation more quickly. This channel can be quite relevant in practice: the reputation of a lawyer winning a complex trial, or an investment bank successfully advising a very big and complex acquisition will get an especially large boost. I dub this the "signalling channel ". The third channel is related to the previous one: if the type of a client a¤ects not only the learning process about the expert's talent, but also the likelihood the expert provides the service successfully, then the way clients sort a¤ects the number of successful clients, and thus the rents from being successful. Winning a complex trial can provide a strong boost to a lawyer's reputation, but winning such a trial may be especially di¢ cult: thus, the premium for being successful may increase, but the likelihood of being successful may be reduced. This in turn reduces the measure of successful experts and raises the premium for being successful. I dub the latter the "toughness channel ". This setting is especially useful to analyse the e¤ects of entry of expert on the incentives to exert e¤ort and raise the likelihood the service is provided successfully (or is provided with higher quality). This important issue is at the core of the debate about the desirability of increasing entry in the market for audit services. As increased entry of experts a¤ects the sorting of clients, this impacts on the incentives to exert e¤ort through the three channels identi…ed above (or through some of them). Thus the paper shows how increased entry can modify the incentives of experts to exert e¤ort. It also provides empirical predictions about the way fees for the services of experts of di¤erent reputation behave after entry occurs. Finally, the paper discusses welfare e¤ects of increased entry and policy implications.
Related Literature
There is a large literature on reputational incentives and on expert advice. The role of reputational incentives (career concerns) has been …rstly modelled in the seminal paper of Holmstrom (1982) who spurred a large literature emphasizing di¤erent aspects and applications. Another important paper which clari…es the nature and the mechanics of reputation is Mailath and Samuelson (2001) . They underline the notion of reputation as an asset and show the importance of maintaining uncertainty on a player's type in order for reputation to play an incentivizing role. Most of the contributions on reputational incentives for expert advice (or …rm behaviour) focus essentially on one expert only and do not really deal with the e¤ects of competition and entry. An important exception is Horner (2002) who shows that competition among …rms acts as a strong discipline device and allows to sustain an equilibrium with repeated play of high e¤ort, even when reputational concerns fade out due to learning about …rms'type.
My paper shares with these contribution the idea that reputation is an asset whose value is a¤ected by the behaviour of the expert. The main di¤erence with these paper is the fact that none of those investigate how the sorting behaviour of clients into experts a¤ects the value of building a reputation and incentives for e¤ort exertion.
There is a large literature investigating the role of competition in markets for expert advice and credence goods. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) provide a thorough survey of the literature and of the most relevant issues. They underline what are the critical assumption that sustain the di¤erent results presented by the literature. Using their terminology, this paper does not impose either the veri…ability assumption (as I assume clients cannot verify the type or quality of service) or the liability assumption (as I assume that clients cannot …ne experts for malpractice). However, I assume the quality of the service is observed by the market, that experts are characterized by a di¤erent ability in providing a good service and they live more than one period, so that reputational concerns provide incentives for the provision of a good quality service (or for avoiding fraud). At …rst sight, this paper describes a setting which is not entirely speci…c to the credence goods market, as I assume experts perform a service whose quality depends stochastically on the e¤ort exerted by the expert, and I assume all clients need the same service, they know the service they need (e.g. advice on how to successfully conclude an acquisition, or assistance to sue a person or an organization) although they di¤er in their valuation of a high quality service. Thus, it seems I overlook the problem of mistreatment and of over-charging. On the other hand, what I de…ne as quality of the service can be interpreted as the provision of the correct service for the need of the client, and then what would really be missing in my set up is a distinction between the diagnosis stage and the service provision stage. I discuss this point at some further length in section 5. In general, the focus of this paper di¤ers from that of most of the literature on credence goods, as I wish to investigate the e¤ects of clients sorting on incentives for the provision of a good quality service, and the e¤ects of entry on such incentives through its in ‡uence on the sorting behaviour of
clients. An important paper on the market for credence goods is Wolinsky (1993) . He shows that customers' search may induce specialization and investigates the e¤ects of search cum diagnosis costs on experts' incentives. He also deals with the e¤ects of reputation. However, that is not linked to expert characteristics (intrinsic talent, type) but is modelled as a Folk Theorem result, thus it is not conform to the idea of reputation as an asset that I use in this paper and that, in my opinion, is more appropriate. An early reference is Pitchik and Schotter (1987) and shows that customers can infer the seller's (expert's) incentives from the observations of market data. He also shows that non fraudulent equilibria exists, and a critical element is the presence of cheating costs. Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) discuss the role of second opinions in a market for expert advice. They analyse a situation where experts make a diagnosis and then clients can decide whether to purchase the service or look for a new diagnosis. They show that the possibility of consulting other experts reduces incentives to exert e¤ort and the equilibria fail to achieve even a second best outcome. However, experts in both papers are identical, have no intrinsic quality and there is no role for reputation (at least for the idea of reputation as an asset). Park (2005) investigates the e¤ects of competition in a model where expert advice is cheap talk. He shows that reputation (intended in a Folk-Theorem sense) helps ensuring truthful information transmission, but competition may reduce such incentives. However, a customer can extract full information by consulting a panel of two experts. Finally, Fong (2005) examines a setting where customers are heterogenous on dimensions that are independent from the type of problem they may have. He shows that monopolistic experts cheat customers on some identi…able heterogeneities such as the extent to which customers su¤er from the problem, or the di¢ culty in treating the customer problem.
This aspect is related to my paper because clients heterogeneity is shown to have important e¤ects on the incentives of experts to provide a good treatment. However, the channels through which this occurs are totally di¤erent as sorting a¤ects incentives to exert e¤ort through the e¤ect on the equilibrium fees, through the informativeness of a success as a signal of talent and through changes in the di¢ culty of the problems experts are hired to solve. In Fong's model selective cheating is a way to price discriminate, which is feasible as experts are monopolists. Therefore, another key di¤erence is that I consider a competitive set up. This paper is also related to the literature analysing the role of middlemen. An early reference is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) . The authors show that middlemen help reducing time to …nd a suitable partner for exchange in a search and matching framework. However, in this model there is no scope for moral hazard or adverse selection, and the only role of middlemen is to reduce the costs related to time consuming search for suitable partners. Biglaiser (1993) introduces adverse selection and shows that middlemen have stronger incentives to acquire speci…c knowledge and specialize in monitoring the quality of products. Such incentives are further raised by reputational concerns. Lizzeri (1999) discusses the strategic information revelation of intermediaries. He shows that intermediaries …nd it optimal to reveal only whether quality is above a certain standard, but competition among intermediaries may lead to the existence of full revelation equilibria. Another interesting contribution is Faure Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2006) who investigate a market for certi…cation intermediaries (rating agencies) and show circumstances in which contractual arrangements which give clients the option to hide the information contained in the ratings arise in equilibrium. They also show that in this way competition among rating agencies reduces the amount of information revealed by the rating agencies. Finally, Strausz (2005) investigates the way reputation (in a folk theorem sense) is e¤ective in ensuring capture of certi…ers does not occur in equilibrium. In his paper, clients are homogenous, and there is no scope for sorting. This paper di¤ers from this literature in two main respects. Firstly, I analyse experts providing a service to clients who value the service in itself, and not as a function of the interaction with another class of agents (…nal consumers, investors, etc.). However, there is some relation as the distribution of clients of the intermediary have important consequences on the incentives of the intermediary to report her information fully and/or correctly. Secondly, this literature does not investigate the e¤ects of entry through changes in the sorting of clients.
The analysis of the paper is tangential to the literature on competition and incentives. A key contribution in this area is Raith (2003) who showed that tougher competition raises incentives to exert high e¤ort. Raith derives the results in a context where …rms provide explicit incentives to managers in order to induce them to exert e¤ort in reducing production costs. The mechanism at work here is di¤erent: …rstly there are no explicit incentives to motivate experts to exert e¤ort to provide a high quality service and secondly tougher competition a¤ects incentives through the sorting behaviour of clients.
This work is also related to some interesting papers on investment banking. An important contribution is Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) . The authors derive a model showing how reputational concerns a¤ect investment banks standards of evaluating IPOs. They also sketch the e¤ects of sorting of clients, but this has not really a direct impact on experts incentives. They show that the equilibrium features positive matching as better …rms hire more talented underwriters. However, they do not investigate how such matching impacts on the incentives of the underwriters to provide their service carefully.
The paper develops as follows: section 3 contains the description of the model set up, section 4 derives the equilibrium and contains three subsections which investigates the three di¤erent channels through which changes in the sorting of clients, induced by increased entry, can a¤ect incentives to exert e¤ort. Section 5 discusses results, assumptions and extensions and section 6 concludes.
The model
The model captures a situation where heterogenous clients decide the expert whom to apply to, clients bid for expert services, fees equate demand and supply, and clients are then matched to experts who provide them the service.
Players and actions: the economy is populated by a continuum of experts and clients and has an overlapping generation structure. Experts are heterogenous both as they are characterized by a di¤erent reputation for being talented and as they are of a di¤erent vintage: experts live for two periods, and in each period there are young and old experts. There is measure 1 2 of each so that, overall there is measure 1 of experts. Clients live one period only and there is measure M > 1 of them. Clients observe the distribution of experts, bid up for the service and fees are determined in equilibrium. Experts have a capacity constraint, so that if the total measure of experts is smaller than the measure of clients, then some clients are rationed 1 . Each client willing to pay for the service is matched to an expert who performs the service. Experts can exert unobservable e¤ort which increases the likelihood the service provided will be of high quality.
Information structure: Clients are characterized by a parameter ; representing how they value the service. Such parameter can represent the quality of a …rm, the gravity of an illness, the complexity of a judicial case, etc. There is a set of types = [ ; ] where 0 < < . I assume client's type is private information 2 , while the distribution of types is common knowledge.
Clients are distributed uniformly over a set of measure M . Experts do not learn the type of clients 3 .
Experts can be talented or not talented and this is symmetrically unknown. All players know the current reputation of an expert which is denoted by t ; indicating the probability, conditional on the information available at time t; that the expert is talented. The outcome (for example, the quality) of the service performed is observed and the market is able to update beliefs about expert's type. I will consider three cases. In the …rst the type of a client only a¤ects her valuation for the service. In this case, sorting can only a¤ect incentives through the fees channel. In the second, the type of clients also a¤ects the probability of success of a talented expert, as follows 
0:
The term z( ) can adjust so as to leave the total probability of a success unchanged. When that happens, sorting of clients determines a mean preserving spread in the total probability of success, so that facing higher types is more informative about the expert's talent, but
does not raise the likelihood of a success. If represents the complexity of a case for a lawyer, this condition says that a success on a more complex case is more likely to come from a talented expert, or that a successful LBO involving a …rm with a very troubling balance sheet situation, is a stronger signal that the advisor investment bank is reputable. The market does not observe exactly the type of each client, but knows, in equilibrium, the distribution of types being served by a given expert 4 .
In this case, sorting a¤ects incentives both through the fees channel and through the signalling channel. The third case allows for the possibility that the (expected) type of the client a¤ects the likelihood of success: providing the service successfully is more likely for certain types of clients. In the latter case sorting a¤ects incentives also through the toughness channel, together with the fees channel and, possibly, the signalling channel.
Timing: the model has an overlapping generation structure. Experts live two periods, clients only one period 5 . Each period a cohort of experts and clients drawn from the same distribution replaces those who exit the market, so that the distribution is stationary. Clients observe the distribution of experts and bid for their services. Then, they get served, until there are idle experts.
If some clients cannot be served, they get an outside option of zero. When clients are matched to experts, the latter exert e¤ort and provide the service, whose outcome is observed by the market 3 This assumption plays a role only when I assume that the type of the client a¤ects the likelihood of a success, or using the terminology of the paper, only when the thoughness channel of sorting works (together with the other two channels). Even in that case, all results hold as long as the expert observes a noisy, but not perfect, signal of the client type. 4 And by all other experts with the same reputation. 5 Alternatively, clients can live foreover, but their type changes. The main idea is that the characteristics of the problem of a client, which are summarized in a client's type, are not constant, but change period by period.
which updates beliefs about experts' reputation. Then clients exit the market and the period ends. The fee can be paid up-front, or after the service has been provided, but it cannot be made contingent on the observed outcome.
Technology: the service provided by experts generates a high or low outcome depending upon the talent and e¤ort choice of the expert, and in some cases, also upon the intrinsic quality of the client. Talented experts, by exerting e¤ort e can raise the chances of providing a high quality service. The cost of e¤ort is a function c(e) where c ee > 0; so that the cost of e¤ort is strictly convex. Untalented experts generate a good quality outcome with a …xed probability independently of e¤ort and of the quality of the client. Formally, I assume that the expected value for a client of type of the service provided by an expert of expected talent is given by
where @V ( ; ; e) @ > 0; @V ( ; ; e) @e > 0 if talented and @V ( ; ; e) @e = 0 otherwise
This says that the expected value of the service is increasing in the expert's talent, it is not decreasing in e¤ort, and the inequality is strict when the expert is talented, otherwise, e¤ort has no e¤ect Secondly, the preferences of clients satisfy single crossing over talent and e¤ort. This implies that if a client of type is indi¤erent between a combination of talent and e¤ort e; over another combination ( e ; e e), then either all clients with types 0 > prefer ( ; e) over ( e ; e e), or all clients with types 0 < prefer ( ; e) over ( e ; e e) but it cannot happen that both a client with type 0 > and a client with type 00 < prefer ( ; e) over ( e ; e e): Also, the service provided by more reputable experts is more valuable to higher types and the marginal value of e¤ort is increasing in client's types, at least when the expert is talented. There can be many examples of such functions. A very standard one is:
where is the probability the expert is talented, (e + ) is the probability that the service provided is of high quality conditional on the expert being talented and exerting expected e¤ort e ; and is a parameter ensuring that a talented expert is valuable even if she exerts no e¤ort 6 . The term 1 2 6 This is useful because the model has two periods and in the last period experts exert no e¤ort as they do not indicates that the probability of a success if the expert is not talented (which occurs with probability
The terms and indicate, respectively, the value of a high and of a low quality service. I also assume a talented expert exerting e¤ort is valuable, therefore, (e + ) > 1 2 , at least for the equilibrium value of e: This function is such that the value of a talented expert lies in the larger probability of producing a high quality outcome. Moreover, more talented experts are more likely to produce a good quality outcome if they face higher types. Alternatively, it could happen that the value of a talented expert resides in the way the service is performed, and not in the chance of success. In an extension of the basic model, I also assume the likelihood of success is a¤ected by the type of the client in the same fashion for talented and untalented experts. When this occurs, I
assume that a high quality outcome is generated with probability Players payo¤: experts get a fee F for the service they o¤er and sustain an unobservable cost of e¤ort c(e); where c is a continuous and convex function. The period payo¤ for an expert is then given by F c(e): However, experts live for more than one period and they also take into account the continuation payo¤ when choosing e¤ort optimally. Therefore the full payo¤ for an expert is
1 is a discount factor and EW ( ) is the expected continuation payo¤, function of future beliefs about the expert's talent. Clients obtain expected value V t ( ; ; e) from the service and pay the fee F t . The latter is set competitively as clients bid for experts services.
Notice that experts cannot o¤er screening contracts, both because there is a continuum of measure of experts with the same reputation, so that it would not be possible, in equilibrium for such experts to provide rents to di¤erent types of clients in order to induce them to reveal their type, and because experts have only one instrument, the fee, to screen clients.
Strategies and beliefs: clients bid for experts services, then fees are determined in equilibrium and clients choose the type of experts from whom to purchase the service. Clients have an application strategy, p( ) : f F e g ! [0; 1]; which is the probability of applying to an expert of reputation ; which is function also of the type of the client, the equilibrium fee, and the expected equilibrium e¤ort e : Applications determine the balance between demand and supply and in this way, equilibrium fees. Then clients are matched to available experts and the latter chooses optimally her e¤ort level, as a function of their beliefs about their talent and the expected fees in the future period, denoted as F t+1 : Formally, e : fF t+1 ; g ! [0; 1 ]; where the latter condition is needed to ensure there is no success with probability larger than 1: Beliefs about experts'talent are updated according to Bayes rule. I consider three cases, in the …rst the (expected) type of clients does not have any reputational concern. Then, if = 0; experts in the second period would be valueless. An alternative is to assume that = 0 and that experts in the second period still have a continuation payo¤ increasing in their quality, so that they will be motivated to exert e¤ort.
a¤ect the likelihood a talented expert succeeds. Therefore
as the probability of a success conditional on being talented and exerting e¤ort e; is given by (e + ) 7 ; while the probability of a success conditional on the expert being untalented is 1 2 : If the service provided turns out to be poor, the reputation of the expert is lowered to
Thus in each period there is measure I also allow for the possibility that the type of the client provides information about the likelihood a talented expert succeeds in providing a high quality service, beliefs about the talent of the expert evolve as follows:
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Clients choose optimally their application strategy and experts choose optimally their e¤ort level. Beliefs are con…rmed in equilibrium, and updated according to Bayes Rule. I …rstly study the most simple model, where the type of clients does not a¤ect either the learning process about experts' talent, or the likelihood that a talented expert succeeds in providing a high quality service.
The basic model
I …rstly study the behaviour of experts with di¤erent "vintage", then I will turn to derive the equilibrium fee and analyse the application policy and sorting behaviour of clients. In this model, as in other career concerns models, there can exist equilibria where the reputation of experts is not valued by the market. I will focus on equilibria where reputation always has a value.
Lemma 1 Experts exert zero e¤ ort in their last period, while they can exert positive e¤ ort in their …rst period
Proof. The payo¤ of any expert in the last period is given by F t c(e t ); where F t cannot depend upon the e¤ort level e t , nor on realized performance. Thus, current period e¤ort e t does not a¤ect the revenues from providing the services, while it costs c(e t ); therefore e t = 0 is the unique optimal e¤ort choice for oldest vintage experts. The behaviour of experts in their second (penultimate) period is more interesting, although the logic is still quite standard. Payo¤ for experts in their …rst period is
and the …rst order condition for e¤ort exertion is
and now exerting e¤ort in period t; raises the chances of obtaining in period t + 1 the fee conditional on being successful in the period t. Incentives to exert e¤ort increase in the premium for being served by an expert who has been successful in the …rst period, and thus improved her reputation.
As the cost of e¤ort is strictly convex, the expert exerts a strictly positive e¤ort in equilibrium if reputation has value.
This result is standard in the literature. The novel part of the analysis lies in the strategic behaviour of clients and in its consequences. Thus, I now derive the preferences of clients over experts with di¤erent expected reputation. This allows to determine the equilibrium composition of the sample faced by experts of di¤erent reputation, and thus the equilibrium fees. The latter will depend upon the value clients attach to the service, which in turn determines clients bids, and the balance between supply and demand. Therefore they will be function of the reputation of the expert, the expected e¤ort level exerted (e ), and of the expected type of client applying to experts of that reputation. Thus, equilibrium fees will be functions F : f ; E( j ); e g ! R:
The fact that experts do not exert e¤ort in the last period has interesting implications for the preferences, and thus the sorting behaviour, of clients. It is obvious that all clients prefer new entrants to old unsuccessful experts, as the latter both are less talented and exert no e¤ort. In fact,
the assumptions of the model imply that V ( ; ; e) > V ( ; ; 0); 8 as > and e > 0: It is less obvious how do clients rate successful experts relative to new entrants.
Experts who are successful in the …rst period have a larger value for clients, as they are more likely to produce a good quality service. On the other hand, they do not exert e¤ort, while new entrants do, and therefore the latter might provide a service whose value is larger than that o¤ered by more reputable experts. In fact, it is not possible, a priori, to tell whether
because the increase in value from applying to a more reputable expert can be more than compensated by the decrease in value due to the lower e¤ort level exerted by an expert with no career concerns. Notice that this e¤ect is always present, even in an in…nite horizon model, as incentives to exert e¤ort fade out as learning about an expert's type become more precise. I solve the model adding a simplifying assumption which does not change the qualitative results 8 .
Assumption 1: for all ; either V (
This implies that preferences over expert talent and e¤ort are the same for all clients. Notice that e = 1 is the maximum level of e¤ort, as the total probability of success is given by e + for talented experts. Then, two cases must be distinguished:
8 I discuss this is greater detail in Section 5.
Case 1: V (
This situation is likely to occur in services for which the talent of the expert is extremely relevant, thus I call this situation the "talent intensive" case. In equilibrium clients bid for the experts services. In any period t all clients would prefer to be served by experts with reputation 
equilibrium fees satisfy the following equalities
Proof. All clients prefer the services of experts with reputation + : Then, fees raise so that demand equal supply and there is no incentive to deviate. As higher types are more willing to pay for the services, when fees go up they will still be willing to pay for the services of most reputable experts.
As there are [ 1 (e 1 + )+ Then it is possible to show that
by the same reasoning as above and noting that < : In the same fashion it is possible to show that also the other types of clients have no incentive to deviate. To complete the proof, I can show that experts cannot do better: experts would prefer to compete for types with higher valuation.
However, clients types are unknown and rents have to be left to induce clients to separate and reveal their type. Experts competing for the best types will have no rents to leave, and therefore no separating contract will be feasible in equilibrium. Moreover, experts can only set fees to screen clients. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium 9 . 9 In …gure 1 clients are distributed uniformly.
Experts
Clients + 1 6 6 6 6 6 6
M Figure 1 This proposition shows that clients sort into experts, so that highest types purchase the service from the most reputable experts, intermediate types purchase the service from experts with intermediate reputation, lower types purchase the service from the experts with the lowest reputation, and …nally very low types do not get served at all, as they value the service too little. Equilibrium fees ensure that demand equals supply for the services of experts of di¤erent reputation and clients have no incentive to deviate.
I now turn to analyse the e¤ects of entry. Increased entry of new experts raises the supply of experts with intermediate reputation. Then, the equilibrium thresholds for clients'sorting are modi…ed and this impacts the types who are indi¤erent in equilibrium, and, in this way, the incentives to exert e¤ort. This discussion is formalized in the following Proposition 3 Entry modi…es the sorting behaviour of clients both in the current and in the future period. The former has no e¤ ect on the incentives to exert e¤ ort. However, the change in sorting behaviour of clients in the future period impacts on the premium that clients are willing to pay to be served by the most reputable experts in a way that unambiguously reduces incentives to exert e¤ ort.
Proof. I denote with a hat the variables after entry occurs. Therefore b is the threshold after entry occurred. Suppose after entry in period t there is now measure M It can be seen that b = ; so that there is no change after entry, in the current period. However, this implies that b is now lower. In fact b is unchanged, while there is now measure Q > 1 2 entrants, and b = b Q implies that b is lower. This also implies that b is reduced. This, however, would have no e¤ect on the incentives to exert e¤ort, as the latter depend upon future period fees. However, entry in period t; also implies that there will be a di¤erent measure of experts in the second period. Successful experts will be
and unsuccessful experts
where b e is the level of e¤ort after entry occurs. Thus, the measure of successful and unsuccessful experts depends both upon the measure of entrants, Q; and endogenously on the new equilibrium e¤ort level b e : The measure of successful, unsuccessful experts, and entrants in period +1; determine the thresholds for indi¤erence b +1 ; b +1 ; b +1 and the equilibrium fees in that period. The latter are critical for e¤ort exertion in the previous period. The …rst order condition for e¤ort exertion is given by @c(e t ) @e t = fF +1 (
exploiting the equilibrium conditions it is possible to show that 
which enter in the …rst order condition respectively with a negative and with a positive sign, are both reduced but the former can be lowered so as to more than compensate all other e¤ects. However, in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, there cannot exist beliefs supporting an equilibrium with new entrants in the current period exerting higher e¤ort and new entrants in the future period exerting lower e¤ort, given they have the same objective function. Therefore, e¤ort must be unambiguously lower after entry.
This proposition shows that it cannot exist an equilibrium where e¤ort is larger after entry occurred. This follows because increased entry in the current period tends to raise both the measure of successful and of unsuccessful experts in the future period. E¤ort can increase if and only if the premium paid for being served by a more reputable expert 12 increases. The latter can occur if and only if the type who is indi¤erent between being served by the most reputable expert or by a new entrant is a type with a higher valuation. However for the latter to occur, e¤ort must be lower, as the measure of "old"experts will be larger in the future period due to increased entry in the current period.
I now describe how the indi¤erent types change. The threshold b +1 can be either higher or lower than the corresponding threshold had entry not occurred, while b +1 < +1 both because of increased entry and because if b +1 > +1 ; then b +1 < +1 otherwise incentives to exert e¤ort would induce a larger e¤ort level which would necessarily cause b +1 < +1 : Finally, the fact that b +1 < +1 also implies that b +1 < +1 : Figures 2 and 3 show the e¤ect of entry in the current period and in the future period on the threshold types. 1 1 I denote all variables with a hat to stress that I am now considering the value for clients after increased entry of new experts occurred. However, notice that b = ; as the prior probability an entrant is talented does not change. On the contrary, b Entry also a¤ects equilibrium fees both in the period when increased entry occurs for the …rst time, and in future periods.
Proposition 4
Fees charged by new entrants and unsuccessful experts are reduced in the period entry occurs, while the e¤ ect on the fees for the service of the most reputable experts is ambiguous.
A similar behaviour occurs in future periods when, however, the premium to be paid to get the service from the most reputable experts must be lower.
Proof. The previous proposition showed that, when entry occurs in the current period:
so that is constant, while and are both reduced. Equilibrium fees are as follows
in fact,V ( ; b ; 0) is lower than before entry, as b < : Then,
is reduced because the di¤erence V ( ; ; e ) V ( ; ; 0) increases in ;
but after entry b < ; and both b e and V ( ; b ; 0) are lower. Finally, behave essentially in the same way, with the exception of b +1 which can be either larger or smaller than ; although this would not alter the (absence of) prediction about F (
This proposition shows that after entry occurs, fees charged by new entrants and by less reputable experts are lower. This is due to the downward movement in the thresholds and . Then, the condition ensuring clients have no incentive to deviate implies that fees for new entrants and less reputable experts must decrease. On the contrary, the e¤ect on the fees paid to most reputable experts is ambiguous. On the one hand, the decrease in the lower thresholds induce all fees to decrease. On the other hand, the decrease in equilibrium e¤ort, raises the di¤erence between the value of being served by the most reputable expert and the value of being served by a new entrant.
Case 2: V ( + ; ; 0) < V ( ; ; 1 ): In this case, experts who were successful in the …rst period o¤er an expected service which is less valuable than that o¤ered by new entrants, even if the latter have a lower reputation 13 . This situation is likely to characterize services for which the e¤ort of the expert is extremely relevant, thus I call this case the "e¤ ort intensive" case. Results are essentially the same as in the previous case. In fact, from the same reasoning as above, in equilibrium it must 1 3 At …rst sight it may seem that new entrants could be better o¤ by not o¤ering the service in the …rst period. That strategy would yield a maximum payo¤ of F ( ; 0): While exerting e¤ort in the …rst period yields a payo¤ of F ( ; 0) + maxefeF (
The expression in curly brackets is non negative, as the expert can always set e = 0; and it is easy to see that F ( ; 0) + maxefeF ( + +1 ; 0) + (1 e)F ( +1 ; 0) c(e)g > F ( ; 0) so that experts always prefer to o¤er their service in the …rst period.
be that
where < < ; and equilibrium fees satisfy
Then, the e¤ect of entry can be immediately veri…ed Proposition 5 Entry reduces incentives to exert e¤ ort.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of proposition 3 and is thus omitted. The main di¤erence with the case of talent intensive services lies in the behaviour of the fees in the current period. In fact, now all fees must be lower. In fact,
. Then, this necessarily implies that b < and b < : On the contrary, the behaviour of fees in the future period are analogous to the talent intensive case.
The type of the client a¤ects the informativeness of success as a signal of talent
I now allow for the possibility that the probability of success for talented experts depends upon the type of clients. This situation is likely to occur in practice. Think of a lawyer winning a class action suit against a large corporation: typically the case will be di¢ cult, and a success is a strong signal of talent. Similarly, a surgeon performing successfully a liver transplant with an innovative technique will increase her reputation more than if she repairs a knee joint. I assume that when the probability that a successful expert provides a service of high quality is increasing in the client's type, beliefs about the expert talent following a success and a failure evolve as follows Pr(T alented j Success; ; e) =
where k(E( j )) is increasing in and thus in E( j ); while z(E( j )) is non increasing in , and thus in E( j ): As the market does not know the exact type of the client served by a given expert, beliefs will be updated using the average type applying to experts with a certain reputation.
Then, sorting of clients generates a further e¤ect on the incentives to exert e¤ort: as k(E( j )) moves, a success can be more or less informative about an expert's talent, and in this way, the value of getting the service from a talented (and from an untalented) expert changes. In fact, if E( j )
is reduced, k(E( j )) goes down and + +1 will be lower, while +1 will be larger. Thus, V ( + +1 ; ; 0) will be lower and V ( +1 ; ; 0) larger, for all : I dub this the "signalling e¤ ect" of sorting. However, the total probability of a success is now t (e + + k(E( j ))) + (1 t )(
Then, it is easy to show that Proposition 6 When the informativeness of success depends upon the type of clients, and the total probability of success is not a¤ ected by sorting of clients, entry reduces the incentives to exert e¤ ort, both through the change in equilibrium fees, and through a reduction in the learning process about experts' talent.
; sorting of clients does not a¤ect the total probability of providing the service successfully. Then, the e¤ect on the indi¤erent types ; ; is the same as in Propositions 4 and 5. The further e¤ect of the change in the informativeness of a success on fees follows easily, as in equilibrium either
when V ( + ; ; 0) < V ( ; ; e ): When entry occurs, both in the talent intensive (V ( + ; ; 0) > V ( ; ; e )) and in the e¤ort intensive (V ( + ; ; 0) < V ( ; ; e )) case, the di¤erence
is (further) reduced as b ; sorting of clients does not a¤ect the total probability of providing the service successfully.
In this case, the sorting behaviour of clients a¤ects the fees both through the increase in the supply of expert services, and through the change in the informativeness of good performance as a signal of the talent of the expert. In particular, if the average type being served by new entrants is lower, then learning about an expert type occurs more slowly and less information is released after the market observes the outcome of the service.
The slower learning about an expert type also a¤ects equilibrium fees in the future period.
Although it is still not possible to tell precisely whether fees for successful experts increase or not, slower learning tends to reduce fees, as the value of being served by successful experts is reduced
: On the contrary, the slowdown in learning tends to increase the fees for unsuccessful experts, as b +1 > +1 ; although it is not possible to tell whether this e¤ect more than compensate for the increase in the measure of experts, which tends to decrease fees.
It is interesting to discuss what happens if sorting of clients a¤ects the total probability of a success. This is a form of the "toughness channel ". Suppose that t (e + + k(E( j ))) + (1 t )( 1 2 + z(E( j ))); raises with 14 : Then, it is possible to prove the following Proposition 7 When the signalling e¤ ect is at work, entry may lead to stronger incentives to exert e¤ ort if clients sorting a¤ ects the total probability of a success in a way that makes new entrants less likely to succeed.
Proof. The e¤ects unveiled in Proposition 6 will still be at work. However, now, the total measure of successful experts, in period +1; after entry occurs in the current period (period 0) is given by
Then, it is possible to have b > ; and b e > e ; because, E( b j ) < E( j ): I distinguish the talent intensive case from the e¤ort intensive case. In the former,
A raise in the threshold type b ; so that b > ; induces an increase in the di¤erence V ( + +1 ; +1 ; 0) V ( ; +1 ; e +1 ) with respect to the pre-entry situation. On the other hand, b e +1 > e +1 moves the di¤erence in the opposite direction. The e¤ect of sorting on +1 is ambiguous. In fact, as the total probability of a success is smaller, it is possible either that b
: If the latter situation occurs, the likelihood that an equilibrium with increased e¤ort after entry exists is larger, while if the former situation occurs, the existence of an equilibrium with increased e¤ort after entry is less likely. If b > ; it is also possible to have b > : In the latter case [V ( +1 ; +1 ; e +1 ) V ( +1 ; +1 ; 0)] can be larger than in the pre-entry case because b > ; b e +1 > e +1 . Therefore, it is possible to have an equilibrium where new entrants exert larger e¤ort after entry occurs. In the e¤ort intensive case, This proposition shows that increased entry may induce new entrants to exert more e¤ort in providing high quality services. It also shows the mechanism through which this can occur. If clients type a¤ects the likelihood talented experts succeed, this can also a¤ect the total probability of success. Then, clients may sort in a way that can reduce the signalling value of a success, and that can also reduce the total likelihood of a success. The latter tends to reduce the measure of successful experts in the second period, thus raising the premium for being served by a successful expert. This in turn, raises the incentives to exert e¤ort. The fact that the total likelihood of success is reduced can ensure that the total measure of successful expert decrease, even in the presence of higher e¤ort exertion from new entrants. It should be stressed that this proposition only shows that it is possible to observe equilibria where new entrant experts exert higher e¤ort in the presence of larger entry, and it delineates the channel through which the e¤ect operates. The existence of such an equilibrium, should be veri…ed on a case by case basis as a function of parameters, clients preferences and of the shape of the distribution of clients type.
I now discuss a further variant of the "toughness channel". I introduce the possibility that the type of the client a¤ects the total probability the expert is successful, impacting on the marginal e¢ ciency of e¤ort. This is a reasonable extension of the previous case: a doctor facing a though operation is less likely to succeed. This may directly impact the e¤ectiveness of e¤ort. This can ensure that entry raises the incentives to exert e¤ort. Formally, I assume that the unconditional probability of a success depends inversely upon the average type of the applicant. Then, the payo¤ of a new entrant expert becomes
and the …rst order condition for optimal e¤ort exertion becomes
thus, if the expected type applying to new entrant goes down, E( j ) is reduced, providing incentives to exert e¤ort, as now a success is more likely. This e¤ect may compensate for the signalling and the fees e¤ects, identi…ed in the previous subsections, that tend to reduce the incentives to exert e¤ort. In fact, it is possible to prove the following Proposition 8 When the clients' type a¤ ects the likelihood the service is provided successfully, entry may increase the incentives to exert e¤ ort.
Proof. Entry reduces all thresholds +1 ; +1 ; +1 : This implies that the di¤erence
] is reduced after entry occurs. Moreover, the change in E( ); may increase the measure of successful experts, reinforcing the e¤ect of entry on +1 ; +1 ; +1 :
However, e¤ort can still be larger due to the decrease in E( ); which raises the marginal e¢ ciency of e¤ort. The exact condition is
The proof shows that it may exist an equilibrium where e¤ort increases after entry occurs. The reason is that even though competition compresses the gains from building a reputation through the e¤ect of sorting on equilibrium fees it can raise the likelihood of a success as new entrants face a pool or relatively "easier" cases. Then, exerting e¤ort is, in expectation, more productive. It is not possible to determine in general which e¤ect dominates. When the type of the client a¤ects the chances the expert succeeds in producing a high quality service, the sorting behaviour of clients after entry occurs, generates a "gentler" environment to new entrants, as they face clients whose needs can be satis…ed relatively more easily. It should be stressed that, again, this is a possibility result, and that the conditions ensuring that entry leads to an increase in the incentives to exert e¤ort, depend upon the distribution of types, as well as on technological variables such as the cost of e¤ort.
Discussion and Policy Implications
This section analyzes the role of the main assumptions and discusses the policy implications of the results.
Assumptions and features of the model
The assumptions of the model are quite standard, although assumption 1 may appear a bit restrictive. it is possible that preferences over talent and e¤ort are not perfectly correlated with the type of the client, so that V ( + ; ; 0) > V ( ; ; e), V ( + ; b ; 0) < V ( ; b ; e) and again V (
In that case, little changes as what matters for the level of the equilibrium fees is how the threshold types ; and ; move. Thus, it will still be possible to identify connected sets of types who prefer a more reputable expert even if she does not exert e¤ort and connected sets of types who prefer a new entrant that exerts positive e¤ort. Then, threshold types will be identi…ed as those who ensure supply is equal to demand for experts of a given reputation, and equilibrium fees will make such threshold types indi¤erent. However, entry can have more complex e¤ects, as now new entrants may be able to attract a pool of clients with a larger average type. Then the signalling may induce stronger incentives to exert e¤ort after entry occurs. The role of the e¤ects will still be the same, although their sign may be di¤erent without assumption 1. The other assumptions that may deserve further comment are those about clients preferences. These are reasonable to capture the kind of market I have in mind, where clients heterogeneity in ‡uences their willingness to pay for the services of experts of di¤erent talent.
The model imagines a setting where clients face di¤erent experts as if they were meeting in the marketplace. An alternative formulation could have been to think of clients as searching for experts.
I believe the way of modelling the market for experts used in this paper is reasonable, as somehow a client has an idea of the di¢ culty of the problem she wants the expert to solve, and thus will look directly for an expert of appropriate quality. The way current period fees are set when the client is matched to an expert would not matter as the critical element is how the value of building a reputation evolves. Investigating the e¤ect of clients sorting and the e¤ect of entry in a search and matching framework certainly constitutes an interesting avenue for future research. In a search and matching context, it could be interesting to investigate a second task that is typically performed by experts: the diagnosis of the problem. This has been investigated in the literature 15 . However, less attention has been put on the study of the way sorting impacts on the incentives to exert e¤ort on the diagnosis as opposed to exert e¤ort on the actual solution of the problem. I do not deal with diagnosis in my model, although that is clearly an important feature of a market for experts, and this, again, could be an interesting extension of this model.
Another aspect which is not dealt with in this model, is that in some instances, obtaining the service from very reputable experts, also embeds a signalling value. This is especially true when the client purchase the service to interact with other agents who extract information on the client's quality from the identity of the expert. Think about IPOs, where the identity of the bookrunner often provides investors a signal about the quality of the …rm. It seems the main insight of this model would still be valid, although this represents another relevant issue which would deserve a fuller treatment.
A …nal point worth discussing is to what extent this can be considered a model for a market for professional services. At …rst sight, there is little in the assumed technology that prevents the application of this model to the analysis of the production of any good, as long as its quality were not observable, so that the price cannot be made contingent on quality. The same model could be applied to the production of a car, or a fridge, etc for which clients have an heterogenous valuation. This is less true when I allow clients types to a¤ect the signalling value of the expert's performance:
it would be di¢ cult to interpret the model as one were a …rm produces an homogenous good. Then, the model could rather be applied to the production of a very customised good, but then, this renders more transparent why this can be really considered as a model for the provision of a service by an expert, and much less a model for a market of manufactured goods.
Policy Implications
The model shows that in some instances entry can reduce incentives to exert e¤ort. Only when the type of the client a¤ects the likelihood of success, increased entry may lead to an equilibrium where e¤ort is higher. However, in all cases entry has a bene…cial e¤ect as a larger fraction of clients get 1 5 See Wolinsky (1993) and Emons (1997) among others.
served. This follows because the increase in the supply of experts modi…es threshold types, this impacts on fees, and now some clients who preferred to get no service at the ongoing fees, decide to purchase the service. Therefore entry can generate a higher level of social welfare even if e¤ort is reduced in equilibrium. This can be seen formally, as welfare before entry, in the talent intensive case 16 A possible way to avoid the potential adverse e¤ect of entry on the incentives to exert e¤ort is to introduce a test, or a certi…cation system for successful experts. The certi…cate, to be valuable, must be correlated with talent. Then, if only the top end of the distribution of experts got the certi…cate, it would be possible to restore rents from exerting e¤ort and succeed in the …rst period.
In fact, even if entry occurs, those who succeed have a chance to get into the top league and the premium to be served by top league successful experts would be independent of entry 18 . Somehow, this kind of institutions seem to arise in practice: league tables for investment banks or …nancial analysts are published every year, and that could be a way to preserve the rents from building a reputation even if competition is …erce. Entry could still have some adverse e¤ects as the premium for successful experts also depends upon the whole structure of fees in the market, in fact depends upon V ( +1 ; +1 ; e +1 ); V ( +1 ; +1 ; e +1 ) and V ( +1 ; +1 ; 0): However, "rationing"the supply of the most talented experts could help to boost the bene…t from increasing entry in a market for expert services.
Conclusion
This paper investigates how the sorting behaviour of clients a¤ects the incentives of experts motivated by reputational concerns. The model shows that sorting can a¤ect incentives in three ways:
…rstly through a change in the equilibrium fees, and thus in the di¤erence between the fees charged by most reputable experts and the fees charged by less reputable ones (fees channel); secondly by a¤ecting the informativeness of a successful provision of the service by the expert: if successful provision of the service for certain type of the clients is more likely to be delivered by talented experts, then, the pool of clients applying to an expert a¤ects the updating of beliefs about an expert talent when performance is observed (signalling channel); …nally, if the type of the client a¤ects the likelihood an expert succeeds, facing "tougher" types could reduce the total probability of success (toughness channel), even if the signal provided by a success would be stronger. I analyze the e¤ect of entry in this framework. Entry a¤ects the sorting behaviour of clients in a way that reduces incentives to exert e¤ort when the fees and signalling channel operates while the toughness channel does not. When also the latter is at work, there can exist equilibria where equilibrium e¤ort is larger after entry occurs. In general, even if entry reduces equilibrium e¤ort, it can lead to higher welfare as more clients get access to the service. The model also provides a rationale for the use of league tables, or other certi…cation mechanisms aiming at "constraining"the supply of more reputable experts: these are bene…cial as they preserve the rents from building a reputation.
